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Introduction 
What does it mean to be recognised as a ‘queer’ refugee in Australia? How do 
adjudicators engage with their identities, emotions, and experiences when determining 
their claims for asylum? In Australian refugee adjudication, numerous challenges arise 
when discerning what constitutes a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution for a clearly 
defined sexual orientation or gender identity-based ‘particular social group.’ Specifically, 
the fact-finding and credibility assessment process in this area of law and policy is 
troubling where it reinforces stereotypical assumptions about sexual citizenship, public 
persecution, gender expressions, and sexual practices while obscuring queer experiences 
or narratives which do not conform to such stereotypes. In doing so, the refugee status 
determination process reveals the attachments, emotions, and expectations of 
adjudicators while covering over the unique narratives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTI2) asylum seekers. While scholars have written 
extensively on the doctrinal development of LGBTI refugee claims and the challenges of 
decision-making in this area, little has been said about the emotional register in which 
these claims are made. Specifically, this paper uses a selection of asylum decisions as 
texts to pick up on the emotional dimensions of refugee adjudication. I use Australian 
decisions alongside  some recent jurisprudence from the European Union to expose the 
ways emotions both enable and stifle the recognition of queer asylum claims. In this 
paper, I draw on cultural philosopher Sara Ahmed’s work on the cultural politics of 
emotion alongside barrister S Chelvan’s Difference, Stigma, Shame, Harm model to 
invite adjudicators (alongside academics and advocates) to critically engage with 
emotion and experience and how it structures queer injury, intimacy, and identity in 
refugee adjudication. Emotion is not simply a personal matter confined to the bodies of 
queer asylum seekers; it also manifests in the asylum adjudication process itself. My 
paper cannot hope to do justice to the rich diversity of queer asylum claims, particularly 
for trans and intersex claimants who remain at the margins of the existing case law. 
However, by combining queer and critical legal scholarship with a selection of refugee 
decisions, I look at the performative nature of emotion to consider how we can improve 
decision-making in this complex area of asylum law and policy while affirming the 
disparate emotional experiences of queer individuals who come before the law seeking 
protection from persecution.  
                                                 
1 Senthorun Raj BA (Hons I, Medal) LLB (Hons I) PhD is a Lecturer in Law at Keele University.  
2 The term ‘LGBTIQ,’ ‘LGBTI’ and ‘LGBT’ have been used differentially in this paper, depending on the 
relevant case or material being discussed. These terms are culturally variable and contested. There have been 
also no published decisions relating to intersex asylum claims and relatively few gender identity claims in 
Australia. These specific claims require further research and critical interrogation.  
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Queering Refugee Law and Emotional Decision-Making 
LGBTI people are subject to discrimination, violence, and harassment in all parts of the 
world. Whether in the developing or developed world, homophobia and transphobia 
remains a pernicious and pervasive problem. In a legislative context, 76 countries 
criminalise consensual same-sex sexual activity and 13 countries have capital 
punishment for such ‘offences’ (ILGA 2016: 36-7). Despite such widespread 
criminalisation and policing, recognising the human rights of LGBT(I) people in 
international legal and policy fora is an emerging phenomenon. In 2007, the Yogyakarta 
Principles was launched by the International Commission of Jurists to promote 
international human rights obligations in relation to sexual orientation and gender 
identity. These international principles act as persuasive interpretations of binding 
human rights treaties and relate to gay, lesbian and transgender people (though intersex 
is a notable omission from the document). In the context of granting asylum, Article 
23(A) of the Yogyakarta Principles identifies an obligation on States to: 
Review, amend and enact legislation to ensure that a well-founded fear of 
persecution on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity is accepted as a 
ground for the recognition of refugee status and asylum (ICJ 2007: 27).  
 
Under Article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention 
1951) there are no specific protected categories of persecution on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. In order to seek asylum, persons must be outside their 
country of origin, and must face a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ owing to their 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, particular social group, or political opinion. 
Australia has recognised ‘homosexuality’ as a valid refugee claim since 1992.3 In 
an oft-cited administrative decision, sexual orientation and gender identity claims have 
been largely defined through the ‘particular social group’ category arising under the 
Refugee Convention 1951: 
When certain societies…choose to identify the group by the immutable 
characteristic of ‘homosexual’ (N93/00846 1994).  
 
The explicit recognition of sexual orientation as a basis for asylum claims is promising. 
However, the process of fact-finding in relation to sexual identity and injury remains a 
troubling element of refugee adjudication. This has generated an enormous body of 
critical legal scholarship aimed at addressing these fact-finding challenges, especially in 
relation to providing normative criteria for adjudicators to define the precise nature of 
identity and persecution (Luibheid 2014; Middelkoop 2013; Hathaway and Pobjoy 2012; 
                                                 
3 I use the term “homosexual” where it has been explicitly used in the decision. This term has a medicalised 
history that is beyond the scope of this paper to address. See, for example, Michel Foucault (1978), The 
History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, New York, USA: Pantheon Books. 
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Johnson 2011; LaViolette, 2010; Millbank 2009; and Millbank 2003). It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to detail these contributions in any great length. Jenni Millbank’s 
work, however, is worth noting, as she has been a leading voice in this field by 
interrogating the conceptual challenges that manifest from administrative decision-
making through to judicial review. Millbank has mapped out two key problems facing 
queer refugees when seeking protection: the notion of a “well-founded fear of 
persecution” is highly gendered and subscribing to stereotypes remains a key basis on 
which (homo)sexuality is authenticated for the purposes of being considered part of a 
‘particular social group’ (1995; 2002; 2003; 2009; and 2012). Catherine Dauvergne and 
Millbank argue that much of the initial jurisprudence in this area focused upon sexuality 
by understanding the ‘social’ in the particular social group category as a shared 
characteristic, innate within individuals (2003: 3). What this obscures, however, is the 
way the queer body is discursively mediated within the legal system (Golder 2004: 2). 
That is, queer identities are not fixed, immutable or universal. The challenge becomes 
conceptualising queer minority refugees in a way that does not occlude their complex 
identities, intimacies and injuries. Prior to the grant of asylum, refugees must satisfy a 
bureaucrat that they have a genuine protection claim. Given the inquisitorial emphasis of 
this process in Australia, asylum seekers who fail to respond (or even understand) 
questions posed by adjudicators often attract adverse inferences of credibility. 
Adjudicators disbelieve claims because they misunderstand queer lives. Judicial review 
operates as a limited safeguard to correct legal errors but assessing the veracity of an 
asylum claim is generally regarded as a matter dealt with administrators who hear the 
evidence while judges review errors on the face of the record (Millbank 2009: 3-6).  
Sexual orientation and gender identity are not reducible to an oblique script of 
genital penetration, sexual object choice, bodily features, mannerisms, dress, or incidence 
of partners. Even international legal documents like the Yogyakarta Principles emphasise 
the emotional and intimate elements of sexual orientation that need not correspond to a 
particular act or identity (ICJ 2007: 6). Irrespective of this, however, administrative 
bodies, such as the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT), often rely on Western stereotypes 
about what constitutes ‘proper’ sex or ‘legitimate’ desire to recognise queer refugees from 
different national contexts. The inquisitorial nature of the bureaucracy combined with a 
lack of strict rules of evidence and limited training for adjudicators result in a number of 
problematic decisions. No specific sexual orientation, gender identity and intersex 
guidelines have yet been developed by the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection (DIBP) to assist caseworkers and adjudicators working in this area. More 
significantly, while fear is a core component of the legal test to determine if a person will 
be granted asylum, little adjudicative attention has been paid to the way this is registered 
in law. Recognising these limitations urges us to pursue more dialogic and creative lines 
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of inquiry that allow us to register the relationship between queerness and emotion in the 
context of LGBTI refugee claims.  
In this paper, I want to advance a more creative line of inquiry by considering the 
emotional and intimate dimensions of not only refugee experiences but also of refugee 
decisions themselves. To do this, I draw on Sara Ahmed’s conceptualisation of emotion 
as a performative enactment to rethink the ways in which decision-makers engage with a 
queer asylum seeker’s fear of persecution.  In The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed 
writes that emotions are not simply embodied states; they are contact zones of movement 
and attachment (2004: 11). Fear, for example, projects us into an experience of the future 
by revealing our proximity to imminent acts or attachments (such as terrorism or 
terrorists) that can hurt or injure us (Ahmed 2004: 62-5). Ahmed notes that whilst we are 
moved by emotion, it also operates to ground the body to a particular space, sign, or 
object. Rather than seek to ask what emotion is, Ahmed invites us to consider what 
emotion does to us. In this paper, I follow emotion through doctrines, facts, and norms 
that shape the adjudication of LGBTI asylum claims. Attending to case law in terms of 
their emotional enactments helps to expose the biases and (hetero)normative limits that 
limit the recognition of queer refugees.  
Queerness, as it relates to subjectivity, is not ultimately confined to a discrete 
identity or identification, but rather reveals our non-normative sexual, gendered, and 
cultural differences (Valdes 2009: p. 107). These dynamic forms of identity and 
identification emerge in emotional and embodied ways – a process of orientation that 
must be understood in specific cultural and historical contexts (Ahmed 2006: 54). In this 
paper, I use queer as a critical term that refers to practices, pleasures, emotions, and 
identities that ‘disorient’ decision-makers by failing to conform to their normative ideas of 
sexuality, nationhood, and family (Bell and Binnie 2000: 13-15). These elusive, non-
normative movements make the adjudication of queer refugee claims challenging. The 
following sections set out these conceptual challenges in more detail and outline ways to 
address them.  
 
Navigating Culture, Experience, and Identity 
Constructions of sexual and gender identity as a ‘particular social group’ in international 
refugee jurisprudence remain elusive and unpredictable. Specifically, asylum seekers in 
this area are in a precarious position given the divergence between social perception, 
social visibility, and immutability tests that underscore legal charaterisations of a 
‘particular social group’ in national jurisdictions (Bresnahan 2010: 651). Within the 
current scope of asylum jurisprudence, recognising the ‘queerness’ of refugees who face a 
well-founded fear of persecution relies on causally relating narratives of possessing an 
‘authentic’ sexuality or the pathology of a ‘wrong body’ to specific incidents of state-
Senthorun Raj 
 5 
related persecution. While there are no published cases on intersex claims in Australia, 
intersex advocacy organisation OII Australia notes that intersex people face persecution 
in several countries through risk of infanticide, coercive surgical procedures, destitution 
and a lack of legal or familial recognition because of their physical sex differences (OII 
Australia, 2011).  
A critical problem for refugee adjudicators is negotiating the cultural differences 
and the emotional experiences of those who seek asylum. In 2012, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) updated its sexual orientation and gender 
identity protection guidelines to address the need for culturally sensitive decision-making 
that disavows stereotypes (UNHCR 2012: 15-16). Psychologist Sharalyn Jordan argues 
that the demand for LGBT (intersex is not specifically featured in her discussion) 
refugees to ‘come out’ forces the narratives of claimants to meet ethnocentric and 
masculine expectations of sexual visibility (2011: 173). Legal scholar Toni Johnson 
elaborates that adjudicators often fail to grasp the emotional ‘tells’ of oral testimony 
because they refuse to imagine experiences of sexual or gender identification that 
contests their pervasive assumptions of what being ‘gay’ looks/sounds like (2011: 70). 
Instead of understanding the reasons for silence, adjudicators use it as a marker to 
impugn an asylum seeker’s credibility. Psychologists Ariel Shidlo and Joanne Ahola 
suggest that the asylum process relies on the asylum seeker lodging a prompt claim while 
disclosing a clear and coherent narrative. Reflecting on their clinical work, they argue 
these demands ignore the impact of post-traumatic stress disorder, internalised shame or 
secrecy, and depression faced many applicants. Indeed, recounting a history of 
persecution is a retraumatising act (Shidlo and Ahola 2013: 9). 
In a gendered sense, female applicants often find that their own stories are often 
substituted by the culturally insensitive imaginations of adjudicators. In one case, a 
female applicant from Mongolia sought asylum on the basis of her sexuality and 
discussed her experience of domestic violence and the public derision she endured 
because of her transgressive romantic attachments. The RRT, however, responded to her 
claim quite dismissively: 
 I accept that the applicant has a girlfriend and that she has had a close 
relationship with this friend since [year]. I have doubts as to whether their 
relationship is a lesbian relationship as the evidence as to how they first 
met and their lack of involvement in the lesbian community is of concern. 
Further the applicant gave little details of the nature of the relationship 
and I felt she was being evasive as to the real basis of their friendship 
(0802825 2008).  
 
Furthermore, 
…[D]espite claiming she was a lesbian that [sic] she had no other contacts 
with lesbian groups or other lesbians after her initial contact with her 
partner in [year] (0802825 2008).  
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While the applicant in this case was deemed to be a refugee, the association between her 
claim to a lesbian identity and her lack of involvement in a purported public ‘lesbian 
community’ was seen to limit her credibility. As the applicant did not choose to disclose 
her sexual orientation or travel with her partner, the RRT defined her intimacy as platonic 
rather than sexual in character. As Nicole LaViolette observes, the emphasis on 
penetrative sexual activity to define sexuality occludes the lives of queer women who 
generate intimacies that do not conform to patriarchal heterosexuality (2010: 182). 
Moreover, being unable to verbally communicate with her partner who spoke a different 
language undermined the applicant’s credibility, as speech was seen by the RRT as 
foundational to romantic intimacy. The ‘real basis’ of the purported relationship was 
understood to be strictly a platonic friendship. Apparently, the applicant had 
‘misconstrued’ it as a homoerotic one. Effectively the applicant’s experience of her 
sexuality was replaced by another assumption of what homosexuality ought to look like. 
Additionally, it is significant to note that her sexual identity was intersected by other 
social differences: the applicant in this case was not simply persecuted for being same-sex 
attracted, but was also subjected to domestic violence. She lacked financial independence 
and remained discreet about her sexual orientation. The inability of the decision-maker to 
recognise her unique emotional and cultural position denied any credibility to the 
romantic experiences she shared in her testimony.  
Bisexuality adds a further critical challenge by countenancing the fluidity of 
sexual desire. As Sean Rehaag notes, bisexual refugees face erasure within an adjudicative 
space that defines sexuality in a homo/heterosexual binary (2009: 423-25). In N98/23086 
(1998), for example, the applicant’s same sex attraction was dismissed as 
‘experimentation.’ Instead of accepting his claim to being attracted to men, his sexual 
identification was eclipsed by a decision maker who believed he had not attempted to 
engage in enough heterosexual relations before being able to ‘qualify’ as ‘really’ gay. 
Moreover, in V97/06483 (1998), the applicant was rejected as being same-sex attracted 
because he had engaged in cross-sex activities and was therefore capable of ‘functioning 
as a heterosexual.’ Taken together, bisexuals are either disbelieved or, if they are believed, 
their capacity for heterosexual relationships is seen to mitigate their need for protection.  
RRT decisions concerning transgender or gender non-conforming asylum seekers 
exemplify some of the anxieties evident in sexual orientation claims when it comes to 
defining the experiences of the ‘particular social group.’ In law, a particular challenge for 
adjudicators has been distinguishing the nuances of gender identity or expression from 
the nature of sexual orientation (Spade 2011 and Sharpe 2002). As LaViolette notes, legal 
perceptions that gender expression is ‘voluntary’ (as distinct from immutable) have been 
difficult to contest (2010: 183). In one case, an applicant from Thailand identified as both 
homosexual and a transvestite, and claimed to be unable to ‘practice being gay openly in 
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the workplace’ and for also being unable to ‘dress as a girl to go to work’ (N03/46498 
2003). I do not claim that adjudicators should have approached this case as one involving 
a trans subject. After all, those who cross-dress often identify with the sex they were 
assigned at birth and do not necessarily identify as trans (Valentine 2007: 32). However, 
while the applicant’s gender identification as a ‘transvestite’ was acknowledged by the 
RRT, no attempt was made to distinguish it from sexuality. Indeed, the claim was 
reduced to whether the applicant was a ‘practising homosexual.’  
However, a promising recent example evinces a more nuanced approach to 
adjudications relating to non-conforming gender expressions. The case concerned a 
transgender applicant from South Korea who identified ‘predominately as male…[with] 
a lot of female characteristics’ (0805932 2008). In elaborating on the ‘blend’ between their 
specific sexual and gender qualities, the applicant also noted that South Korea confused 
being homosexual and transgender. In response, the RRT defined the relevant particular 
social group as ‘male homosexuals with transgender characteristics.’ Rather than conflate 
sexual orientation with gender identity, the RRT were clear to distinguish the ‘imputed 
transgender’ characteristics from ‘homosexuality’ by referencing Australia’s Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade country information advice. While acknowledging possible 
connections, sexual orientation and gender identity were differentiated in the decision.  
In a more recent case, Australia granted protection to an asylum seeker who 
identified as a (heterosexual) post-operative transgender female from Malaysia on the 
basis of their gender identity (0903346). Here, the RRT accepted that the applicant 
belonged to the class of a ‘Malaysian transgender woman without familial or financial 
support or protection’ (0903346 2010). While the RRT affirmed the claim, the 
enormously narrow particular social group in this case militated against the decision-
maker accepting ‘transgender’ as a social group on its own. The RRT was concerned that 
such a category would be too broad. In narrowing the particular social group, the RRT 
considered evidence which showed that individuals who identified within such a social 
group lacked employment options, frequently engage in sex work, and use drugs. No 
financial or familial support was available to the asylum seeker either. Elaborating on the 
culturally specific context of the claim, the RRT made reference to the fact that male-to-
female transsexuals or ‘mak nyah’ or ‘aravanis’ are subject to an Islamic ‘fatwa’, and 
must be subject to policing (0903346 2010). While we can commend the culturally 
nuanced approach to adjudicating a trans refugee claim from Malaysia, the highly 
specific particular social group formulation in this case seemed to be determined, at least 
indirectly, through numerous references to persecution (such as a lack of familial or 
financial support or protection). In other words, anxieties over making the particular 
social group category ‘too broad’ deny protection to trans asylum seekers who are unable 
to demonstrate their belonging to a highly narrow category of social experience.  
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Managing Visibility 
During 2011, a claim made amidst international concern about the Ugandan Anti-
Homosexuality Bill 2009, a female asylum seeker from Uganda had her sexual 
orientation impugned because her relationship with another woman did not conform to 
the expectation that lesbian sexuality should be easily visible. She claimed: 
I have kept my homosexuality private in Uganda because I fear for my life. It is 
for this reason that I did not directly associate with or join lesbian groups 
(V1102095 2011).  
 
Refusing to accept this testimony at the initial interview, the departmental delegate 
claimed she ‘had merely adopted the persona of a homosexual’ for a protection visa.  By 
judging her claims against some abstracted lifestyle, being gay became synonymous with 
consumerism or promiscuity. On review, while her claims were accepted, the 
administrative decision-maker did not consider how the bureaucratic stereotype of an 
amorphous ‘homosexual persona’ denied the ways queer asylum seekers negotiated their 
intimate lives in specific cultural contexts. Due to a lack of cultural curiosity (or even 
desire to seek country information) on the part of the initial decision-maker, her claim 
was rejected.  
Ethnocentric indexes used by adjudicators to visibly render a person’s sexuality 
produce a ‘double bind’ for queer asylum seekers to negotiate. Hesitancy in oral 
testimony often undermines the credibility of the narrative, whilst well-scripted 
recountings of experience are disbelieved for the lack of emotional response. Either the 
individual fails to provide a ‘coherent and plausible’ narrative because of shame or 
trauma, or they respond in an unemotional manner, which makes the accounts of sexual 
persecution unbelievable (Millbank 2009: 17). In particular, prior to being ruled unlawful 
by the High Court in 2003, the evidentiary difficulties of proving one’s sexual orientation 
were supplemented by a ‘discretion’ test which required applicants who had chosen to 
keep their sexuality secret back home to continue to do so in order to mitigate the risk of 
persecution (S/395 2002 and S/396 2002 v MIMIA 2003). Despite this landmark ruling, 
adjudicators are still able to discount any activity undertaken in Australia that is deemed 
to be self-serving in bolstering the protection claim. In 2014, reforms to migration law 
have further restricted the scope of progressive asylum jurisprudence: adjudicators may 
deny protection by deeming an asylum seeker’s expressive activity or behaviour as 
something that could ‘reasonably’ be modified to avoid the threat of persecution 
(Migration Act 1958 5J).  
Culturally different experiences of sexuality and gender diversity must be 
translated across different emotional, as well as linguistic, positions (between the 
adjudicator and the applicant). If emotion marks the point at which an asylum seeker is 
rendered credible or not, refugee adjudicators must critically engage with the experience 
of emotion, in order to avoid erasing the marginal voice of the queer refugee when 
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seeking to understand the nature of persecution itself. Barrister S Chelvan argues that a 
way of framing queer experiences is using the difference, stigma, shame and harm 
(DSSH) model. Instead of seeking a chronological or linear account of sexual or gender 
identity, Chelvan suggests we should focus on when the applicant identified as different, 
how this difference was stigmatised by others, how the stigma generated (self) shame and 
the extent to which the shame and stigma resulted in harm (Chelvan 2013: 28).  
Understanding what counts as ‘serious harm’ involves intensely emotional experiences 
that are not easily imparted to adjudicators. The previously discussed case concerning a 
lesbian applicant from Mongolia exposed how ‘coming out’ within a marital context of 
domestic violence can be particularly fraught: 
She told me that on [date] her husband came to her home and raped 
and beat her…She fears that he will repeat his assault if she returns and 
this is what made her decide to leave Mongolia…She also feared that if 
it became known that she was a lesbian that her child would be taken 
away from her and no one would look after the applicant’s interests 
(V1102095 2011). 
 
This discussion of persecution troubled the public/private divide in the law. For women, 
who were positioned within the domestic sphere as victims of violence, the matter may be 
deemed to be a ‘family issue’ and not a matter for state intervention. Sexual practices (or 
being marked as a lesbian) in the context of this case carried the threat of displacing 
motherhood: the applicant risked losing her child. Economic pressure and physical 
violence also coerced the applicant into managing her sexual visibility, enduring her 
marital harassment to avoid being marked as a lesbian in a public context. The applicant’s 
fears were an anchoring point for how she managed her queer visibility. She refused to be 
public about her abuse to the police because she feared it would result in further 
discrimination. The marital home became a material rather than a metaphorical closet by 
policing her same-sex desire. Her queer desires, if rendered public, would then threaten 
her legal status as a capable mother. This case evinces the need for refugee adjudicators to 
critically reflect on their own cultural or emotional location, just as much as the asylum 
seekers themselves, when ‘hearing’ refugee narratives. 
Applying critical legal theory approaches to refugee adjudication complicate 
the parochial legal constructions of identity and persecution. For Millbank, the refugee is 
delineated ‘through gendered notions of the public and private’ (2003: 72). She suggests 
that decision makers conflate peripheral sexuality with ‘ruptures’ in the public order 
(Millbank 2003: 87). Much of Millbank’s analysis considers the paradoxical notion of 
‘visibility’ and ‘privacy’ by undermining the problematic assumptions of lesbian refugee 
bodies. These bodies are cast as either exhibiting overt displays of sexual activity or 
subject to erasure within a patriarchal logic that narrates sexual activity solely in terms of 
phallic penetration (Millbank 2003:. 82-3). Millbank elaborates that there needs to be 
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significant shifts for administrative decision-making ‘to articulate an expression of public 
sexuality in a human rights framework’ or ‘sexual self-determination’ (Millbank 2003: 
92). Expanding on this human rights-based argument, I want to articulate the value of 
engaging with emotion and experience as a way to critique the rigidity of refugee 
adjudication processes that seek to determine what counts in authenticating a sexual or 
gender identity.  
 
Representing Emotion and Persecution   
Emotion poses significant challenges to legal representation. Echoing feminist legal 
theorist Robin West, providing a space for marginalised people to relate their emotional 
stories is a crucial component for doing justice to the excluded subject in the law (1988: 
141-3). By noting that identity is produced in an emotional context, there is greater 
possibility for thinking about how diasporic desire, sexuality, and violence can be 
experienced in different spaces. In the following case, the applicant from Lebanon 
recounted his desire to lead an ‘open gay lifestyle’; however, this was met with some 
social difficulties:  
As to whether he had been anywhere in Australia where homosexual men, 
whether Arabic-speakers or not, socialised, he said that he had gone 2-3 times to 
Place E but nowhere else. He said he was not used to the atmosphere there 
(1000152 2010).  
 
Moreover, the applicant noted: 
As to whether he had had any contact with homosexual men in Australia, he said 
he had not met anybody. He added that ‘I don't like the system here - the way 
they dress’  (1000152 2010). 
 
In this case, the asylum seeker provided an easily discernible account of his desire to live 
free from persecution. However, it did not necessarily follow that living as an ‘out’ (and 
purportedly visible) gay man came without problems in the asylum country. Despite his 
regular attendance at a particular social venue, as he was ‘not used to the atmosphere’, his 
social and erotic agency was limited. By abstractly referencing the Australian ‘gay scene’ 
in terms of a peculiar way of dressing, the asylum seeker articulates his emotional 
discomfort. His desire to live an ‘open’ life was underscored by his lack of sexual desire 
for other homosexual men and his inability to engage in the available social ‘atmosphere’ 
in Australia (Raj 2011: 178). Recognising the asylum seeker’s shifting sexual attachments 
requires adjudicators to appreciate the emotional pressure of sexual identification.  
Exploring the relationship between sexual identifications and violence requires a 
focus on both emotion and space. Persecution is an embodied experience that cannot be 
reduced to singular modes of being or identity (Mason 2002: 59). Fear of violence 
becomes embedded in a sense of belonging to a space and how one understands that 
feeling. In the case of the Lebanese asylum seeker who chose to not engage in sexual 
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activity with other men, the RRT queried the kind of fear his body risked if he was 
returned home:  
As to what he had feared would happen to him in Lebanon if it was [sic] known 
he was homosexual, he said that he had mental pressure. Also if his family knew 
they would have a big problem. It was a strict family. Socially he would be an 
outcast (1000152 2010). 
 
Injury, in this testimony, was articulated as the constant threat of violence if he made his 
desire visible: ‘if his family knew they would have a big problem.’ In order to be granted 
refugee status, a history of physical violence need not exist. In this case, the fear of being 
an ‘outcast’ and prospective persecution was articulated through familial imaginaries 
(Mason 2002: 60). Space became crucial to the articulation of his experience of 
persecution: injury was a risk in the domestic space (including literal and symbolic 
isolation from the home). Understanding injury through the applicant’s emotional sense 
of (non)belonging – the threat of being repudiated from his familial space – enables us to 
see how his fear produced a ‘mental pressure’ to conceal his sexual orientation. Even 
when an asylum seeker’s sexual or gender identity is recognised, their claim for harm can 
be dismissed for not amounting to a well-founded fear of persecution. Like this applicant 
from Lebanon, queer asylum seekers can find it difficult to establish a causal link to the 
absence of state protection when much of the violence they emotionally endure occurs at 
home – perpetrated by their family or community.  
Emotional responses to violence emerge in the negotiation of shared spaces. In 
discussing the emotional dynamics of fear, Ahmed argues that fear does not reside 
internally within a particular body. Rather, it is a visceral exchange between competing 
gazes (Ahmed 2006: 62-3). Fear projects us into an experience of the future, an imagining 
or feeling of anticipated hurt or injury (Mason 2002: 64). As a female applicant from 
Vietnam recounted (071862642), fear was the anticipation of physical and verbal assaults: 
For a long time I didn't have any relationship mainly due to the fact that 
I was afraid to go through the same things all over again. In spring [year 
deleted] I met [name deleted] and we started seeing each other as a 
couple. Our situation was not better than before, meaning, we had to 
pretend to be just friends (071862642, 2008).  
 
In this testimony, the connection with being ‘afraid’ and the previous history of abuse is 
clear: ‘I was afraid to go through all the same things all over again.’ Fear limited queer 
social (and sexual) intimacies by projecting an imagined set of taunts or injuries that 
could happen ‘all over again.’ Even when the asylum seeker engaged in a relationship 
with another woman, the constant threat or fear of violence determined how that queer 
intimacy was rendered visible. Fear motivated them to ‘pretend to be just friends.’ In this 
case, the performance of friendship thus became both a psychological and physical 
necessity to manage the fear of persecution. 
 
Senthorun Raj 
 12 
Troubling Progress  
In recent years, there has been celebrated case law seeking to better recognise emotional 
experiences of persecution and curb the way in which stereotypes infiltrate refugee 
adjudication. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), for example, has circumscribed the 
intrusive questions, sexual stereotypes, and types of evidence that can be used to 
determine asylum claims. Yet, such progressive international refugee jurisprudence has 
enacted some of the fears that underpin the fraught adjudication processes I have 
discussed so far in the Australian cases. In Joined Cases of A, B, and C (2014), three asylum 
seekers in the Netherlands were denied protection on the basis that they had not been 
credible (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13, 2014). In all three cases, the applicants were 
either willing to submit, or had already submitted, pornographic evidence to prove the 
veracity of their sexual orientation. Each claim had initially been refused by the 
Netherlands on the basis that the narratives were ‘vague, perfunctory, and implausible’ 
(Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 22-9). In response to these claims, the ECJ 
overruled any residual use of sexually demeaning questions and pornographic evidence 
for demonstrating the veracity of a person’s sexual orientation. Yet, the decision still 
permitted the use of some stereotypes to assess the credibility of an asylum seeker’s self-
identification about their sexuality.  
According to an advisory opinion authored by Advocate General Sharpston prior 
to the Court’s final ruling, an assessment of sexual orientation began with self-
identification and this should be assessed in specific rather than general terms. After all, 
‘an averred sexual orientation cannot be objectively verified’ (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-
150/13, 2014, [43]). In condemning current methods of sexual verification, AG Sharpston 
observed that medical exams, pornographic evidence, sexual stereotypes, and prurient 
questioning were inconsistent with the protection of privacy and dignity in the European 
Charter. They were ‘blacklisted’ (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 54). However, a 
number of methods of verification that existed on a ‘grey list’ were permissible in 
credibility assessment: including a failure to disclose sexual orientation at the earliest 
opportunity and a lack of ‘general knowledge’ about LGBTI organisations in the 
applicant’s home country (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 54). Verification took 
on a public rather than private dimension. Instead of appeal to sexual discretion, the 
Court focused on the need for an applicant to be public about their sexuality. Reference to 
this ‘grey list’ also evinced that much like an analysis of persecution, credibility 
assessment and visibility were intimately connected. In this case, sexual identity was a 
collectivised experience: being able to identify LGBTI public groups and disclose 
queerness publicly were markers of credibility.  
 Even when moving away from stereotypes or invasive sexual questioning, AG 
Sharpston reiterated the need to authenticate the veracity of a person’s sexual orientation. 
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She not only condemned medical testing as problematic because homosexuality was not a 
disease but also because sexual testing (like determining whether or not a person was 
physiologically aroused by gay pornography) failed to distinguish ‘genuine applicants 
from bogus ones’ (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 62). Moreover, questions that 
relied on stereotypes were dangerous because ‘bogus applicants’ may have ‘schooled 
themselves in preparing their application’ (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 65). As 
Didier Fassin argues, the ‘refugee question’ has been tightly circumscribed in recent years 
by normative ideas of ‘truth’ (whether an asylum claim fits within the legal framework) 
and ‘true’ (the veracity of asylum experiences). What was once an issue of ‘humanitarian 
compassion’ has now become a matter of ‘anxious control’ (Fassin 2013: 41). By tracing a 
broad historical shift in the process of recognition, Fassin also reveals a shift in a register 
of emotion: seeking asylum is not a right born from the recognition that everyone is 
entitled to seek asylum, but rather a matter of state discretion (or a ‘gift’) conferred once 
claims have been thoroughly scrutinised (2013: 55). Fassin’s argument helps identify the 
politics of anxiety that underpins adjudicating asylum claims: experiences must be 
interrogated to avoid ‘bogus’ claims succeeding. The hypermobility of bogus refugees is 
met with a need to contain them (Ahmed 2004: 73). While scholars have critiqued the 
socio-legal construction of the ‘bogus’ refugee, the affective ways in which this claim 
appears in the law itself has yet to be fully considered (Fassin 2013; Johnson 2011; and 
Millbank 2009).  In Joined Cases of A, B, and C, sincerity was an issue for adjudicators to 
probe but the current methods of credibility assessment militated against that. In fact, the 
anticipation of bogus claims worked – as a threat to the integrity of asylum processing – to 
rethink methods of verification. Fear worked to reveal the proximity to threat: bogus 
claims were brought into circulation by stereotypes and assumptions that could be 
performed by anyone. AG Sharpston’s advisory opinion revealed how fears of erroneous 
adjudication as a result of such misdirected interrogations pushed away some stereotypes 
while reproducing the need to heighten scrutiny of asylum claims in other ways. Fear and 
anxiety circumscribed the fact-finding dimensions of refugee adjudication.  
 In reiterating the need for credibility assessment to respect dignity and privacy, the 
ECJ ruling strengthened the need for assessment to ensure the veracity of queer claims. 
Self-identification was important but it was not determinative of an applicant’s sexual 
orientation (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 52). The Court also returned to the 
use of stereotypes in a partial sense: they may be a ‘useful element’ in adjudication but 
they could not be the sole basis on which an asylum claim was determined (at the 
exclusion of personal circumstances) (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 62). The 
ECJ, however, repudiated the use of detailed questions about sexual experience, as it was 
contrary to respect for private life. In doing so, the Court suggested that even if applicants 
were willing to provide oral or visual evidence of their sexual activity, such evidence was 
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to be refused on the basis that it had very limited probative value (Joined Cases C-148/13 to 
C-150/13 2014: 65). Dignity and privacy were invoked in this decision as both covers and 
containers – ones to shield sexual minority refugees from humiliating questions by 
containing the kinds of questions that may be asked of them. Unlike the cases discussed 
above, the containment here worked to shield queers from being forced to endure 
bureaucratic experiments to assess sexual orientation. The container worked to limit 
questions that affront personal dignity rather than to protect the (persecutory) 
administrative sensibilities that may be affronted by visible queerness.  
Yet, these progressive gestures of containment also evince fear: encouraging 
stereotypes opened up the asylum process to abuse by ‘bogus’ claimants who threatened 
the integrity of adjudication. Joined Cases of A, B, and C loosened the understanding of 
intimacy and expression to recognise the vulnerable position of queers in the status 
determination process (Joined Cases C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 70). Yet, identifying the 
performative dimensions of sexuality worked to expose the vulnerability of the 
determination process itself. Disingenuous applicants could ‘game’ the system by 
rehearsing the stereotypes used to measure sexual identity and intimacy. As a 
consequence, the Court found that a shift from demeaning sexual questions to ones that 
enabled personal narrative would strengthen the quality of decision-making (Joined Cases 
C-148/13 to C-150/13 2014: 60-1). Adjudicators need not only reflect on the threats facing 
refugees if returned home but they must also turn their attention to the threats of those 
‘bogus’ claimants. In the jurisprudence, the act of eschewing prurient sexual questions 
and pornographic evidence became a means of protecting the adjudication process – 
containing the threat of insincerity. The demand for authenticity was reproduced rather 
than repudiated and the Court was able to pull away from the fact that all sexualities were 
performative.   
Fear in the Joined Cases of A, B, and C invites us to consider that instead of policing 
queer asylum narratives, decision-makers should open them up and consider the 
consequences of emotion or fearful disclosure. Both the decision and existing critical legal 
scholarship outlined above have emphasised that questions should focus much less on 
sexual activity or testimony about ‘discovering’ one’s identity and more on uncovering 
personal experiences of being ‘different’ (which do not necessarily follow a linear 
trajectory). Asylum seekers should be asked about what makes them different, when they 
realised that difference was considered socially as ‘wrong,’ how they came to experience 
shame because of that realisation, and finally what harms they may have also experienced 
because of it (Chelvan 2013: 28). Moreover, silence must also be accommodated in the 
interpretation of queer asylum narratives. While the ECJ did not consider the issue of 
silence and difference in enormous depth, the case did open up new ways of thinking 
about belonging to a particular social group and experiencing persecution. Evasion of 
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questions about homophobic violence or refusals to speak about a particular sexual 
activity became points for dismissing the idea these claims were disingenuous. However, 
the case did not open up queer emotional experiences of marginalisation: the depths of 
sexual shame or stigma were confined. Fear worked in this case to contain the scope of 
sexual minority asylum – both in terms of the applicant’s claim for protection and the 
adjudication of that claim even while it limited the humiliating questions or evidence that 
could be demanded of queer asylum seekers.  
 
Conclusion  
Queer asylum claims continue to challenge assumptions about identity, persecution, 
credibility, and experience that underscore international refugee law and its 
administration in national contexts. The purpose of this paper has been to use emotion as 
a conceptual register to tease out some inconsistencies and paradoxes that limit status 
determination processes at a legal and administrative level in Australia. In doing so, my 
paper has not been one that fully probes the alignment of international refugee law with 
its Australian counterpart nor has it detailed the bureaucratic dimensions of refugee 
adjudication more broadly. Moreover, I want to emphasise that the diversity of queer 
experiences, particularly relating trans and intersex people have not been fully addressed. 
Instead, I have used cases as texts, including more recent progressive interventions from 
the EU, to expose how and why adjudicators struggle to adopt an analysis that engages 
with queer experiences of injury, intimacy, and identity. Queer refugee experiences of 
navigating the asylum system are emotionally dynamic and have the capacity to (re)shape 
identities and how individuals identify with a particular sexual orientation or gender 
identity. They also have the capacity to redefine the normative boundaries of refugee law.  
In order for adjudicators to better engage with queer refugees, they must be 
willing to interrogate their own emotional and conceptual attachments to narrow ideas of 
sex, sexuality, gender identity, and persecution. This largely involves eschewing 
stereotypes in favour of attending to the emotional dynamics of queer experiences in 
adjudication. While I am wary of prescribing the exact forms such ‘attending’ should 
take, the queer affective critiques advanced in this paper should set the scene for 
adjudicators looking to develop more reflexive recognition and robust protection of 
queers fleeing persecution. In this paper, I have argued that by queering emotion, thinking 
of it as an adjudicative enactment that arises when norms and narratives come into 
contact, we can expand the adjudicative space for protecting queer refugees.  
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